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Abstract
We discuss a property of quasi-concavity for inequality measures. Defin-
ing income distributions as relative frequency functions, this property says
that a convex combination of any two given income distributions is weakly
more unequal than the least unequal income distribution of the two. The
quasi-concavity property is not essential to the idea of inequality compar-
isons in the sense of not being implied by the fundamental, i.e., Lorenz type,
axioms on their own. However, it is shown that all inequality measures con-
sidered in the literature—i.e., the class of decomposable inequality measures
and the class of normative inequality measures based on a social welfare
function of the rank-dependent expected utility form—satisfy the property
(and even a stronger version). The quasi-concavity property is then shown to
greatly reduce the possible inequality patterns over a much studied type of
income growth process.
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1 Introduction
Consider two income distributions, defined as relative frequency functions, as well
as a convex combination of these two income distributions. As an example, take
two groups of income receivers, with income distributions f and g, that are merged.
In that case, the income distribution of the merged group is a convex combination
of those of the two original ones: α f (x)+(1−α)g(x) for all incomes x, where α is
the share of the population size of the group with income distribution f in the total
population size of the merged group. Can anything in general be said with respect
to how a convex combination of any two given income distributions relates in terms
of income inequality to each of those given two income distributions? In this paper
it is shown that a general statement concerning this question is possible for the two
classes of inequality measures that, together, encompass virtually the entire litera-
ture on inequality measures—viz., the class of decomposable inequality measures,
and the class of normative inequality measures based on the general social welfare
function of the rank-dependent expected utility form. These inequality measures
turn out to satisfy a property of quasi-concavity, saying that any convex combina-
tion of two given income distributions is at least as unequal as the least unequal
of the two. Moreover, the inequality measures even come close to satisfying strict
quasi-concavity: if the two given income distributions have unequal means, then
the convex combination is strictly more unequal than the least unequal of the two
income distributions. We believe the result is of technical interest since it shows
that simple mathematical properties, hitherto not explicitly studied in the literature
on inequality measurement, hold very generally. Moreover, although the quasi-
concavity properties are satisfied by all well known inequality measures, they are
not necessary characteristics of the idea of inequality in the sense that they are not
implied by the fundamental, i.e., Lorenz type, axioms. Indeed, the fact that, as we
shall see below, some direct implications of the quasi-concavity properties have
received criticism in the literature, reveals that they are not uncontroversial.
Besides being of technical interest, the result is relevant to the question of how
inequality evolves during a process of income growth in a dual economy, a topic
that has interested economists since Kuznets (1955). At any stage of such an in-
come growth process the economy is characterized by an income distribution which
is a convex combination of the income distributions in the first (low mean income)
stage and in the final (high mean income) stage—the later the stage, the greater
the weight of the final stage income distribution. The question of interest is how
inequality evolves during the transition from the first to the final stage income dis-
tribution. Kakwani (1988) and Anand and Kanbur (1993) amongst others have
shown that various popular inequality measures imply that inequality follows an
inverted-U pattern—i.e., inequality increases at the early stages of the process and
decreases afterwards. We show that this is an implication of the considered quasi-
concavity properties, which are satisfied by all these inequality measures. Taking a
more fundamental perspective, Fields (1987, 1993) has argued that, during a sim-
plified income growth process, inequality should follow a different pattern, viz.,
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a U pattern. Fields’ work can be seen as a critique of some the consequences of
the quasi-concavity properties. Our result enables us to generalize the findings of
Kakwani and of Anand and Kanbur and reveals that it is impossible to find any in-
equality measure conforming to the standard approach in the literature that allows
expression of Fields’ view, even if this view is watered down severely.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with notation and basic
concepts. In Section 3, we show axiomatically that the quasi-concavity properties
are satisfied by all inequality quasi-orderings satisfying the transfer principle, a
weak invariance axiom, and decomposability. Instead of focussing exclusively on
relative inequality concepts, as is common in the literature, we consider the weak
invariance axiom of Bossert and Pfingsten (1990) that allows for relative and abso-
lute inequality concepts as well as intermediate ones. We believe the given context,
which is typically concerned with inequality comparisons of income distributions
with unequal mean incomes, makes such a more general approach relevant. While
the result of Section 3 applies to, amongst others, the inequality measures based on
a social welfare function of the expected utility form, it does not apply to its rank-
based alternatives, the generalized Gini indices, as these are not decomposable.
Therefore, we consider in Section 4 the class of inequality measures (absolute,
relative as well as intermediate cases) based on a social welfare function of the
rank-dependent expected utility form, which generalizes both the class of expected
utility inequality measures and the class of generalized Gini indices. Benefiting
from functional representability of the given inequality orderings, it is shown that
the quasi-concavity properties are also satisfied by all members of this general class
of normative inequality measures. In Section 5 we spell out the implications of the
results of Sections 3 and 4 for the question of how inequality evolves during a pro-
cess of income growth in a dual economy. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are
contained in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Suppose there is a finite number of individuals in society each having a pos-
itive income which is an element of R++. Let the relative frequency function
f : R++ → [0,1] represent the income distribution, the number f (x) being the pro-
portion of the population with income x. We denote the set of income distributions
with F . We write the support of any f ∈ F as {x f 1,x f 2, . . . ,x f n}. For any in-
come distribution f ∈F , the mean income, ∑ni=1 f (x f i)x f i, is denoted with µ( f ).
Inequality comparisons of income distributions are captured by a binary relation 
(“is not more unequal than”) over the elements of F . The relation’s asymmetric
and symmetric factors are denoted ≺ and ∼, respectively. We assume that the rela-
tion  is a quasi-ordering, i.e., is reflexive and transitive. A quasi-ordering that is
complete is an ordering. An inequality measure is defined as a function I :F →R
that represents some inequality ordering.
Before we can define the axioms and properties, it is necessary to introduce
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three additional pieces of notation. First, an income distribution g is said to be
obtained from any f ∈ F by a mean preserving spread if and only if, for any
x∈R++\{x1,x2,x3,x4} such that x1 < x2 ≤ x3 < x4, it holds that g(x)= f (x), while
g(x1) = f (x1)+ δ , g(x2) = f (x2)− δ , g(x3) = f (x3)− δ and g(x4) = f (x4)+ δ ,
where δ > 0 is a scalar such that g ∈ F and µ( f ) = µ(g). Informally, when g
is obtained from f by a mean preserving spread, this means that g is obtained
from f by a series of regressive transfers. Second, for any f ∈F , let fx 7→ψ(x) =
f ◦ψ−1. So, for instance, fx 7→γx denotes the income distribution obtained from f by
multiplying each individual’s income by γ . Finally, for any f ,g∈F and any scalar
α , let α f +(1−α)g denote the function α f (x)+(1−α)g(x) for all x ∈ R++.
We now define three basic axioms. The first is the well known transfer principle
which says that regressive transfers increase inequality.
Axiom 1 (TP). For any f ∈ F , if g is obtained from f by a mean preserving
spread, then f ≺ g.
The second axiom is a general invariance condition proposed by Bossert and
Pfingsten (1990).
Axiom 2 (β INV). There is some scalar β ∈ [0,1] such that the following holds.
For any f ∈F and any scalar λ such that fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ) ∈F it holds that f ∼
fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ).
The axiom (β INV) generalizes the popular relative (β = 1) and absolute (β =
0) cases. Inequality relations satisfying (β INV) for β ∈ (0,1) are referred to as
intermediate inequality relations. In line with the literature, we consider (TP) and
(β INV) to be the fundamental axioms.
Finally, a popular but certainly less compelling axiom is decomposability, which
says, loosely speaking, that any transformation of the income distribution that
changes only the incomes of a subgroup of the population and leaves mean in-
come unaffected, should affect overall inequality in the same direction as it affects
the income inequality in the subgroup.1
Axiom 3 (DEC). For any f ,g,h ∈F such that µ( f ) = µ(g) it holds that
f  g⇔ α f +(1−α)h αg+(1−α)h for any α ∈ (0,1).
The main focus of this paper are the properties quasi-concavity and strict quasi-
concavity which describe a particular way in which a convex combination of two
given income distributions compares in terms of inequality with these given two
income distributions.
Property 1 (QC). For any f ,g ∈F it holds that
f  g⇒ f  α f +(1−α)g for any α ∈ (0,1). (1)
1For a critique of decomposability, see Sen and Foster (1997, pp. 149-163). The axiom they refer
to as “subgroup consistency” is closest to our definition.
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Property 2 (SQC). For any f ,g ∈F such that f 6= g it holds that
f  g⇒ f ≺ α f +(1−α)g for any α ∈ (0,1). (2)
More relevant than (SQC), however, will turn out to be the following property
which says that (2) has to hold only conditionally.
Property 3 (CSQC). For any f ,g ∈F such that µ( f ) 6= µ(g), (2) holds.
Obviously, (SQC) implies both (QC) and (CSQC), while the latter two proper-
ties are independent.
Using the minimal framework of inequality quasi-orderings, we examine in
Section 3 the relationships between the three basic axioms of inequality measure-
ment and the quasi-concavity properties. The main result of the section is that the
three axioms (TP), (β INV) and (DEC) are sufficient for the properties (QC) and
(CSQC) to hold. In Section 4, similar results are shown to hold for the members
of an important class of inequality orderings consistent with (TP) and (β INV) but
not (necessarily) with (DEC).
3 Inequality Quasi-Orderings
Before we present the main result of this section, we consider some direct links
between, on the one hand, the axioms separately or in pairs, and, on the other
hand, the properties (QC), (SQC) and (CSQC), and the natural counterparts of the
former two, viz., quasi-convexity and strict quasi-convexity.
Property 4 (QV). For any f ,g ∈ F \ { f ∈ F | f (e) = 1 for some e ∈ R++} it
holds that
f  g⇒ α f +(1−α)g g for any α ∈ (0,1). (3)
Property 5 (SQV). For any f ,g∈F \{ f ∈F | f (e) = 1 for some e ∈ R++} such
that f 6= g it holds that
f  g⇒ α f +(1−α)g≺ g for any α ∈ (0,1). (4)
Note that the perfectly equal income distributions are excluded from the set of
income distributions over which (3) and (4) are required to hold in the definitions of
(QV) and (SQV). The reason for this is that the properties (QV) and (SQV) would
otherwise be incompatible with the commonsense requirement that any unequal
income distribution is strictly more unequal than any perfectly equal one.2
First, we wish to point out the relationship between the fundamental axioms
(TP) and (β INV) and the five properties. Before we move on, consider the follow-
ing lemma which will be useful in what follows.
2This can straightforwardly be seen by letting f and g in (3) or (4) both be perfectly equal income
distributions (with f 6= g). Note, furthermore, that the “commonsense requirement” is implied by
(TP) and (β INV) jointly.
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Lemma 1. Let  be an inequality quasi-ordering satisfying (TP) and (β INV).
Then, for any f ∈F and any scalar λ such that fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ) ∈F and f 6=
fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ), it holds that f ≺ α f +(1−α) fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ) for any α ∈ (0,1).
The following remark is an immediate corollary of Lemma 1.
Remark 1. Any inequality quasi-ordering satisfying (TP) and (β INV) does not
satisfy (QV).
Although, jointly, (TP) and (β INV) rule out both (QV) and (SQV), the axioms
do not imply the counterparts of these axioms (QC) or (SQC) and also not (CSQC).
The following example illustrates this.
Example 1. Take the inequality measure I( f ) = AI10GE( f ) + I−9GE( f ), where A is
a positive and finite scalar and where IθGE is the generalized entropy inequality
measure, given by
IθGE( f ) =
1
θ 2−θ
n
∑
i=1
f (x f i)
[(
x f i
µ( f )
)θ
−1
]
,
where θ > 0. Since the generalized entropy inequality measure satisfies (TP)
and (β INV) (for β = 1), I obviously satisfies the axioms as well. Contrarily,
IθGE satisfies (DEC), while I does not. Now consider three income distributions
f , g and h such that ( f (10) , f (50)) = (0.4,0.6), (g(10) ,g(50)) = (0.9,0.1) and
(h(10) ,h(50)) = (0.65,0.35). Let, moreover, A = I
−9
GE( f )−I−9GE(g)
I10GE(g)−I10GE( f )
. It holds that
23.370 = I(h) = I
(
1
2
f + 1
2
g
)
< I( f ) = I(g) = 270.061,
which implies that I violates (QC), (SQC) and (CSQC). Furthermore, it can be
shown that (4) holds for the chosen f and g.
The example shows that not all reasonable inequality quasi-orderings, in the
sense of consistency with the fundamental axioms (TP) and (β INV), must satisfy
(QC) and (CSQC). However, in this paper it is shown that all inequality quasi-
orderings commonly considered in the literature do so.
Second, we consider the relationship between the (DEC) axiom and the five
properties. The axiom is clearly related to both (QC) and (QV) as the following
remark shows.
Remark 2. Let  be an inequality quasi-ordering satisfying (DEC). Then, (1) and
(3) hold for any f ,g ∈F such that µ( f ) = µ(g).
Remark 2 reveals that (DEC) imposes linearity over sets of income distribu-
tions with equal means—i.e., a convex combination of any two given income dis-
tributions with equal means must lie, in terms of inequality, between those two
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given income distributions. Clearly, then, on its own (DEC) implies a bias to nei-
ther (QC) nor (QV). Note that, for all pairs of income distributions f ,g such that
µ( f ) = µ(g) and f ∼ g, (2) and (4) fail to hold if (DEC) is satisfied. So, given
the weak assumption (which would be implied, for instance, by continuity) that at
least one such pair f ,g exists, (DEC) is incompatible with both (SQC) and (SQV).
Also note that, for all pairs of income distributions f ,g such that µ( f ) = µ(g) and
f ≺ g, (2) and (4) are implied by (DEC). Consequently, (CSQC) is in a sense as far
as one can go in the direction of (SQC) while still satisfying (DEC): for all pairs
of income distributions f ,g for which (SQC) implies (2) while (CSQC) does not,
either (DEC) already implies (2), or (DEC) is inconsistent with (2).
To summarize, we have seen that (TP), (β INV) and (DEC) rule out (QV),
(SQV) and, typically, (SQC) and that, moreover, the fundamental axioms (TP) and
(β INV) are not sufficient for (QC) or (CSQC). The following result shows that any
inequality quasi-ordering satisfying (TP), (β INV) and (DEC), must satisfy (QC)
as well as (CSQC), i.e., comes as close to satisfying (SQC) as allowed by (DEC).
Proposition 1. Any inequality quasi-ordering satisfying (TP), (β INV) and (DEC)
satisfies (QC) and (CSQC).
Proposition 1 has implications that are relevant in the context of the study of
the evolution of inequality in a developing country. We postpone the discussion of
these implications until Section 5, but consider here relevant results concerning this
context by Kakwani (1988) and Anand and Kanbur (1993) that are generalized in
Proposition 1. Anand and Kanbur present results that imply that the inequality or-
derings represented by the following relative inequality measures satisfy (CSQC):
the first and second Theil inequality measures, the coefficient of variation, the en-
tire class of Atkinson inequality measures, and the Gini index in the case of non-
overlapping income distributions f and g.3 The same has been shown by Kakwani
for the entire class of generalized entropy inequality measures, thus generalizing
the results pertaining to all measures considered by Anand and Kanbur except the
Gini index.4 Proposition 1 shows that neither the demand that inequality be a rel-
ative concept nor even completeness or continuity are essential in obtaining the
result. Examples of absolute inequality measures covered by Proposition 1 are
the variance and the entire class of Kolm inequality measures. Notable inequal-
ity measures that Proposition 1 does not deal with—because they do not satisfy
(DEC)—are the Gini index in the general, possibly overlapping, case, as well as
its rank-based generalizations. In the next section, we show that a similar result as
3Moreover, the logarithmic variance, also considered by Anand and Kanbur, can be added to the
list. Anand and Kanbur borrow the result concerning this inequality measure from Robinson (1976).
We do not consider the logarithmic variance as it does not satisfy (TP).
4Kakwani (1988, pp. 210-213) mistakenly believes to have proved the result only for the gener-
alized entropy inequality measures for which θ ≥ 1 and θ = 0. However, he proves the result also
for the entire Atkinson class which is ordinally equivalent to the generalized entropy class in the case
where θ < 1. Therefore, the ordinal nature of the property (CSQC) implies that the result applies to
the entire generalized entropy class.
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Proposition 1 holds for a class of normative inequality measures that encompasses
both the well known classes of decomposable normative inequality measures (the
Atkinson and Kolm inequality measures) and the generalized Gini indices.
4 Normative Inequality Orderings
Normative inequality measures are based on some conception of social ethics, cap-
tured by a social welfare function W : F → R. Define the equally distributed
equivalent income for any income distribution f ∈F , ξ ( f ), as the per capita in-
come which, if distributed equally, yields the same level of social welfare as f .
That is, ξ ( f ) for any income distribution f ∈ F is defined as ξ ( f ) = e, where
e ∈ R++ is such that there is a g ∈F such that g(e) = 1 and W ( f ) = W (g). It is
common to define relative normative inequality measure using
I( f ) = 1− ξ ( f )
µ( f ) , (5)
and absolute normative inequality measures using
I( f ) = µ( f )−ξ ( f ) . (6)
We assume throughout this section that, for any f ∈F , the elements of the support,{
x f 1,x f 2, . . . ,x f n
}
, are indexed such that x f 1 < x f 2 < · · ·< x f n.
The well known Atkinson and Kolm inequality measures are based on a social
welfare function of the expected utility (EU) form,
W ( f ) =
n
∑
i=1
f (x f i)u(x f i), (7)
where u : R→ R is a continuous and strictly increasing function. The relative
(Atkinson) case, which we denote with I1,εEU , is obtained as (5) with W as in (7) and
u(x) =
1
1− ε x
1−ε
, (8)
where ε > 0. Following Bossert and Pfingsten (1990), the general class of rela-
tive and intermediate EU inequality measures—more specifically, those satisfying
(β INV) for 0 < β ≤ 1—is defined as Iβ ,εEU ( f ) = 1β I1,εEU
( fx 7→βx+1−β) for all f ∈F .
Finally, the absolute (Kolm) family of EU inequality measures (corresponding to
β = 0), denoted with I0,γEU , is obtained as (6) with W as in (7) and
u(x) =−exp(−γx) , (9)
where γ > 0. All members of the relative, intermediate and absolute families of
EU inequality measures satisfy (TP), (β INV) and (DEC) and thus are covered by
Proposition 1.
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The generalized Gini indices are based on a social welfare function of the Yaari
form (Yaari, 1987),
W ( f ) =
n
∑
i=1
pi
(
f (x f i) ,
i
∑
k=1
f (x f k)
)
x f i, (10)
where, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,(n−1),
pi
(
f (x f i) ,
i
∑
k=1
f (x f k)
)
= φ
(
n
∑
j=i
f (x f j)
)
−φ
(
n
∑
j=i+1
f (x f j)
)
,
pi( f (x f n) ,1) = φ( f (x f n)) and φ : [0,1]→ [0,1] is a continuous and strictly increas-
ing function with φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1. The relative case, denoted with I1,φYaari, is
given by (5) with W as in (10). Again, following Bossert and Pfingsten (1990), the
complete class of relative, intermediate and absolute Yaari (or generalized Gini)
inequality measures is obtained as Iβ ,φYaari( f ) = 1β I1,φYaari
( fx 7→βx+1−β) for all f ∈F .5
In order for the inequality measure to satisfy (TP), φ has to be strictly convex. A
well known subclass of the generalized Gini indices is that of the S-Gini indices
for which φ(p) = pρ , where ρ > 1, with as a notable special case the Gini index
(ρ = 2).
Both the complete class of EU inequality measures and the complete class of
Yaari inequality measures are encompassed by a more general class of inequality
measures based on a social welfare function of the rank-dependent expected utility
(RDEU) form,
W ( f ) =
n
∑
i=1
pi
(
f (x f i) ,
i
∑
k=1
f (x f k)
)
u(x f i), (11)
where, for all i = 1,2, . . . ,(n−1),
pi
(
f (x f i) ,
i
∑
k=1
f (x f k)
)
= φ
(
n
∑
j=i
f (x f j)
)
−φ
(
n
∑
j=i+1
f (x f j)
)
,
pi( f (x f n) ,1) = φ( f (x f n)) and φ : [0,1]→ [0,1] and u : R→ R are continuous and
strictly increasing functions with φ(0)= 0 and φ(1)= 1. The relative case, denoted
with I1,ε,φRDEU , is given by (5) with W as in (11) and either u as in (8) or u the identity
function. Again, following Bossert and Pfingsten (1990), we obtain the relative,
intermediate and part of the absolute RDEU inequality measures as Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ) =
1
β I
1,ε,φ
RDEU
( fx 7→βx+1−β) for all f ∈F . This class includes the cases where 0 < β ≤ 1
if u is not the identity function and the cases where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 if u is the identity
function. Hence,
Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ) =
1
β
1−
(
∑ni=1pi
( f (x f i) ,∑ik=1 f (x f k))(x f i + 1−ββ )1−ε) 11−ε
µ( f )+ 1−ββ
 , (12)
5The absolute case is obtained by taking the limit β → 0.
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where 0 < β ≤ 1 if ε > 0 and 0≤ β ≤ 1 if ε = 0, and where pi is defined as above.
The absolute RDEU inequality measures not given by Iβ ,ε,φRDEU are the cases where u
is not the identity function. These are obtained as (6) with W as in (11) and u as in
(9) and are denoted with I0,γ,φRDEU . Hence,
I0,γ,φRDEU( f ) = µ( f )+
1
γ
ln
[
n
∑
i=1
pi
(
f (x f i) ,
i
∑
k=1
f (x f k)
)
(exp(−γxi))
]
, (13)
where γ > 0 and pi is defined as above. RDEU inequality measures satisfy (TP) if
and only if φ is strictly convex when u is the identity function and convex other-
wise.6 It is straightforward to see that all members of the EU and Yaari classes of
inequality measures are members of the class of RDEU inequality measures given
by (12) or (13): whenever φ is the identity function, the class of RDEU inequality
measures reduces to the class of EU inequality measures, and whenever u is the
identity function (ε = 0 in (12)), the inequality measures are of the generalized
Gini type. The only inequality measures in the RDEU class that satisfy (DEC) are
those that also belong to the EU class. RDEU inequality measures for which nei-
ther φ nor u is the identity function, and which, consequently, belong to neither the
EU class nor the Yaari class, have been studied by Ebert (1988) and Chateauneuf
et al. (2002). Ebert (1988) shows that, in general, RDEU inequality measures also
incorporate a decomposability idea, obviously a weaker one than (DEC).
To prove a result similar to Proposition 1 for the entire RDEU class, we require
the following well known result which we state formally and prove for the sake of
completeness.
Lemma 2. Let W be a social welfare function of the RDEU form, given by (11).
Then, the following two statements hold:
(i) If φ is convex, then W is convex, i.e., for any f ,g ∈F it holds that
W (α f +(1−α)g)≤ αW ( f )+(1−α)W (g) for any α ∈ (0,1).
(ii) If φ is strictly convex, then W is strictly convex, i.e., for any f ,g ∈F such
that f 6= g it holds that
W (α f +(1−α)g)< αW ( f )+(1−α)W (g) for any α ∈ (0,1).
The following proposition says that the properties (QC) and (CSQC) are sat-
isfied for inequality orderings representable by any member of the class of RDEU
inequality measures.
Proposition 2. Let  be an inequality ordering that satisfies (TP) and is repre-
sentable by any RDEU inequality measure, given by (12) or (13). Then, the follow-
ing two statements hold:
6See Chew, Karni and Safra (1987).
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(i) If φ is convex, then  satisfies (QC) and (CSQC).
(ii) If φ is strictly convex, then  satisfies (SQC).
Proposition 2 says that (SQC) is satisfied if the weighting function correspond-
ing to the RDEU inequality measure is strictly convex, while this need not be the
case if the weighting function is convex. The following remark makes it clear
that there is a general positive relationship between the degree of convexity of the
weighting function and the degree to which full (SQC) is approached.
Remark 3. Let 1 and 2 be two inequality orderings that both satisfy (TP) and
are representable by any RDEU inequality measures, given by (12) or (13). Let,
moreover, the respective weighting functions φ1 and φ2 be such that φ1 is “at least
as convex as” φ2, i.e., there exists a convex function χ : R→ R such that φ1 =
χ ◦ φ2. Then, for any f ,g ∈F and any α ∈ (0,1), f ≺2 α f +(1−α)g implies
f ≺1 α f +(1−α)g, while the converse does not hold.
The proof of Remark 3 is implicit in the proof of Proposition 2 and is therefore
omitted.
5 Inequality and Income Growth in a Dual Economy
We shall now examine how the properties (QC) and (CSQC) are related to the
question of how inequality changes during a process of income growth in a dual
economy. In such an economy, the population is distributed over a traditional sec-
tor and a modern one. We denote the income distribution associated to the tradi-
tional sector with g and that associated to the modern sector with f and assume
µ( f )> µ(g). In the first stage of the income growth process, the economy is com-
pletely traditional and hence is characterized by the income distribution g, while
in the final stage it is completely modern and hence characterized by the income
distribution f . During the transition from a traditional to a modern economy, it is
assumed that population shifts from the traditional sector to the modern sector in a
gradual fashion. By consequence, at any stage strictly in between the first and the
final, the income distribution of the economy as a whole is α f +(1−α)g, where
α ∈ (0,1) is the percentage of the population in the modern sector. The question is
how inequality evolves during this growth process, i.e., as α rises over the interval
(0,1). As we have seen in the previous sections, all well known inequality con-
cepts satisfy the properties (QC) and (CSQC). As the following proposition shows,
these properties turn out to greatly reduce the number of allowed patterns that de-
scribe inequality evolution during the considered growth process. The proposition
focusses on (CSQC) which has the stronger implications of the two properties, and,
for convenience, restricts attention to inequality orderings.
Proposition 3. Let be an inequality ordering for which (CSQC) holds. Consider,
moreover, a dual economy income growth process with as the first and final stage
income distributions respectively any g ∈F and f ∈F such that µ( f ) > µ(g).
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Then, only the following three patterns describing the evolution of inequality dur-
ing the income growth process are possible:
(i) An inverted-U pattern, i.e., there exists an α∗ ∈ (0,1) such that, for any
α,α ′ ∈ (0,α∗], if α > α ′ then
α ′ f + (1−α ′)g≺ α f +(1−α)g,
and, for any α,α ′ ∈ [α∗,1), if α > α ′ then
α f +(1−α)g≺ α ′ f + (1−α ′)g.
(ii) A strictly increasing pattern, i.e., for any α,α ′ ∈ (0,1), if α > α ′ then
α ′ f + (1−α ′)g≺ α f +(1−α)g.
(iii) A strictly decreasing pattern, i.e., for any α,α ′ ∈ (0,1), if α > α ′ then
α f +(1−α)g≺ α ′ f + (1−α ′)g.
Fields (1987, 1993) has studied the considered income growth process in its
most simple case, i.e., that where the first and final stage income distributions
are both perfectly equal. He notes that, on the one hand, the popular inequality
measures—by which he means those studied by Anand and Kanbur (1993) (see
our Section 3)—all imply an inverted-U pattern of inequality in this case, while,
on the other hand, different patterns are also plausible. In his own work, Fields
defends a U pattern on the basis of the notions “elitism of the rich” and “isolation
of the poor.”7 Loosely speaking, elitism of the rich says that, for relatively high
values of α , increases in α lead to greater inequality because the “rich” (i.e., those
in the modern sector) then attain a more elite position. Similarly, isolation of the
poor says that, for relatively low values of α , decreases in α cause inequality to
increase because the “poor” (i.e., those in the traditional sector) then become more
isolated.8
Proposition 3 allows us to generalize some of Fields’ observations. A first
implication of the proposition is that continuous inequality orderings that satisfy
(CSQC) always imply an inverted-U pattern, not only in the simple case consid-
ered by Fields, but also in the more general case where the perfectly equal first
and final stage income distributions are replaced by any two income distributions
7See especially Fields (1993).
8The simple case of the income growth process has also been considered by Temkin (1986) and
by Amiel and Cowell (1994). Using his own framework for inequality measurement, the philosopher
Temkin gives justifications for the three patterns dealt with in Proposition 3 as well as for a pattern
of constant inequality during the entire process. Amiel and Cowell provide questionnaire results
showing that respondents support several patterns amongst which the U pattern proposed by Fields
is quite popular.
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that are equally unequal.9 By Proposition 1 and 2, this holds for all continuous in-
equality measures considered in the literature, not only for the inequality measures
dealt with by Anand and Kanbur. Note that, for the case with first and final stage
income distributions that are equally unequal, the patterns (ii) and (iii) in Proposi-
tion 3 are only possible for noncontinuous inequality orderings since these patterns
involve a discontinuity at α = 0 or at α = 1.10 A second implication of Propo-
sition 3 is that the U pattern proposed by Fields cannot occur for any inequality
ordering satisfying (CSQC), not even when the condition that the initial and final
stage income distributions are equally unequal is dropped. Furthermore, even over
part of the income growth process, i.e., as α rises over a subinterval of (0,1), a U
pattern is impossible. Note, however, that, as Example 1 shows, the fundamental
axioms (TP) and (β INV) do not exclude the occurrence of a U pattern over part of
the income growth process for some first and final stage income distributions.
6 Conclusion
The literature on inequality measurement has focussed exclusively on the specific
strategy of supplementing the fundamental axioms, (TP) and (β INV), with decom-
posability ideas, i.e., ideas concerning how changes in the inequality of subgroups
have to relate to changes in overall inequality—directly, in the form of the (DEC)
axiom, or, indirectly, by basing inequality measures on a (RDEU) social welfare
function that incorporates a weak decomposability condition. It was shown in this
paper that all inequality measures considered in the literature satisfy the quasi-
concavity properties (QC) and (CSQC). Moreover, it was shown that the latter
property implies that only three patterns describing how inequality evolves during
a process of income growth in a dual economy are possible.
The results of this paper clarify and generalize a problem revealed by Fields
(1987, 1993). Fields has pointed out that in a simple case of the dual economy
income growth process more patterns are plausible than the three that our results
show to be implied by (CSQC). Since our analysis reveals that the properties (QC)
and (CSQC) limit the allowed patterns even in far more general cases and that,
moreover, these properties are satisfied by virtually all inequality measures con-
sidered in the literature, it allows us to state Fields critique with more force. If it
is argued that all plausible views about inequality comparisons should be express-
ible, then we have to conclude that the properties (QC) and (CSQC) unduly limit
the scope of inequality measurement. It follows that, if we want a more satisfac-
tory theory of inequality measurement, then we should focus on supplementing the
fundamental axioms in alternative ways, rather than with decomposability ideas.
9Note that in the case considered by Fields, the first and final stage income distributions are also
equally unequal. At least, this would follow from (β INV) or from the common sense assumption
that all perfectly equal income distributions are equally unequal.
10An example of an inequality ordering that satisfies (TP), (β INV) and (DEC) and yet never im-
plies an inverted-U pattern can straightforwardly be constructed on the basis of the leximin social
welfare ordering.
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Appendix: Proofs
For convenience, in the proofs we usually abbreviate, for any f ,g ∈ F and any
scalar α , the expression α f +(1−α)g with α f g.
Proof of Lemma 1
Take any f ∈F , any scalar λ such that g = fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ) ∈F and f 6= g, and
any α ∈ (0,1). Note that, by definition, λ = µ(g)−µ( f )βµ( f )+1−β .
Consider h = fx 7→x+λ ′(βx+1−β ), where λ ′ = µ(α f g)−µ( f )βµ( f )+1−β . The choice of λ ′
ensures that µ(h) = µ(α f g). We now prove the claim that by (TP), h ≺ α f g
holds. Note that the supports of f , g and h have the same number of elements.
Now, clearly, to any element of the support of f , say x, there corresponds ex-
actly one element in the support of g, viz., x + λ (βx+1−β ), which appears
with frequency f (x). By consequence, in α f g, there is, for any element in the
support of f , a pair of incomes such that the sum of frequencies is f (x) and the
mean income for the group of individuals with any of these two incomes is αx+
(1−α)(x+λ (βx+1−β )). Similarly, to any element in the support of f , x, there
corresponds exactly one income in the support of h, x + λ ′ (βx+1−β ), which
appears with frequency f (x). Now, it can be checked that x+ λ ′ (βx+1−β ) =
αx+(1−α)(x+λ (βx+1−β )). Therefore, α f g can be obtained from h by a
sequence of mean preserving spreads. Hence, h≺ α f g by (TP). Since , moreover,
f ∼ h by (β INV), f ≺ α f g holds by transitivity. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that any f ,g ∈ F such that f  g and any α ∈ (0,1) are given. Since
the case in which µ( f ) = µ(g) has already been dealt with in Remark 2, we only
consider the case in which µ( f ) 6= µ(g).
Consider h = fx 7→x+λ (βx+1−β ), where λ = µ(g)−µ( f )βµ( f )+1−β . The choice of λ ensures
that µ(h) = µ(g). Two cases are possible: either (a) h ∈F , or (b) h /∈F .
(a) In the first case f ∼ h by (β INV), so that, by transitivity, h g. Clearly then,
by (DEC), α f h α f g. By Lemma 1, f ≺ α f h, so that, by transitivity, f ≺ α f g .
(b) The second case occurs if and only if λ is such that in going from f to
h, nonpositive incomes get nonzero frequency (which is only possible if µ( f ) >
µ(g)). Consider ˆf = fx 7→x+λ ′(βx+1−β ) and gˆ = gx 7→x+λ ′(βx+1−β ), where λ ′ is some
scalar such that [x∗+λ ′ (βx∗+1−β )]+λ (β [x∗+λ ′ (βx∗+1−β )]+1−β )> 0
with x∗ the lowest income to appear with nonzero frequency in f . We can then
return to the beginning of this proof and prove the result for ˆf and gˆ without getting
case (b). If the result holds for ˆf and gˆ, then it must hold for f and g as well by
(β INV) and transitivity. 
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Proof of Lemma 2
First note that (11) can be rewritten as
W ( f ) = u(x f 1)+
n
∑
i=2
φ
(
n
∑
j=i
f (x f j)
)[
u(x f i)−u
(
x f (i−1)
)]
.
Take any f ,g∈F and any scalar α ∈ (0,1) and write the support of α f +(1−α)g
as {x1,x2, . . . ,xn} with the elements indexed such that x1 < x2 < · · ·< xn. We then
have
W (α f +(1−α)g)
= u(x1)+
n
∑
i=2
φ
(
n
∑
j=i
[α f (x j)+(1−α)g(x j)]
)
[u(xi)−u(xi−1)]
≤ α
[
u(x1)+
n
∑
i=2
φ
(
n
∑
j=i
f (x j)
)
[u(xi)−u(xi−1)]
]
+(1−α)
[
u(x1)+
n
∑
i=2
φ
(
n
∑
j=i
g(x j)
)
[u(xi)−u(xi−1)]
]
= αW ( f )+(1−α)W (g) ,
where the inequality follows from the convexity of φ . The inequality holds strictly
whenever φ is strictly convex and f 6= g. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Take any f ,g ∈F such that f  g, and any scalar α ∈ (0,1).
We first consider the case where  is representable by (12). Defining the func-
tion W β as W β ( f ) = W
(
f
x 7→x+ 1−ββ
)
for all f ∈F with W as in (11) and u as in
(8), we have
Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(α f g) =
1
β
1− ((1− ε)W β (α f g)) 11−ε
µ(α f g)+ 1−ββ

. (14)
We have to show the following: (a) expression (14) is at least as great as (strictly
greater than) Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ) whenever φ is (strictly) convex, and (b) expression (14) is
strictly greater than Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ) whenever µ( f ) 6= µ(g).
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Firstly, consider
1
β
1− ((1− ε)[αW β ( f )+(1−α)W β (g)]) 11−ε
µ(α f g)+ 1−ββ
 (15)
=
1
β
1− 1
µ(α f g)+ 1−ββ
α [µ( f )+ 1−ββ ]1−ε
(
[(1−ε)Wβ( f )]
1
1−ε(
µ( f )+ 1−ββ
)
)1−ε
+ (1−α)
[
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
]1−ε( [(1−ε)Wβ(g)] 11−ε(
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
)
)1−ε 11−ε

=
1
β
[
1−
[
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]
A
]
,
where
A =
[
α
[
µ( f )+ 1−ββ
]1−ε
+(1−α)
[
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
]1−ε [ 1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]1−ε] 11−ε
µ(α f g)+ 1−ββ
= B×C,
where
B =
α
[
µ( f )+ 1−ββ
]
+(1−α)
([
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
][
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
])
β [αµ( f )+(1−α)µ(g)]+ 1−ββ
(16)
and
C =
[
α
[
µ( f )+ 1−ββ
]1−ε
+(1−α)
[
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
]1−ε [ 1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]1−ε] 11−ε
α
[
µ( f )+ 1−ββ
]
+(1−α)
([
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
][
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
])
=
[
1− I1,εEU(αh1 +(1−α)h2)
]
, (17)
where h1,h2 ∈ F are such that h1(x) = 1 if x = µ( f ) + 1−ββ and h2(x) = 1 if
x =
[
µ(g)+ 1−ββ
][
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g)
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]
.
Secondly, notice that 1β
[
1−
[
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]
BC
]
≥ Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ), since 0 < B≤
1 and 0 < C ≤ 1. Since, moreover, it follows from Lemma 2 that whenever φ
is (strictly) convex, expression (14) is at least as great as (is strictly greater than)
expression (15), (a) follows. Notice that whenever µ( f ) 6= µ(g) and IβRDEU( f ) =
16
Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g), it holds that B = 1 but C < 1, so that 1β
[
1−
[
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]
BC
]
>
IβRDEU( f ), and whenever µ( f ) 6= µ(g) and Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ) < Iβ ,ε,φRDEU(g), B < 1, so that,
again, 1β
[
1−
[
1−β Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f )
]
BC
]
> Iβ ,ε,φRDEU( f ). Together with the fact that con-
vexity of φ implies that expression (14) is at least as great as expression (15), (b)
follows.
We now consider the second case where  is representable by (13). Using W
as in (11) and u as in (9), we have
I0,γ,φRDEU(α f g) = µ(α f g)+
1
γ
ln(−W (α f g)) . (18)
The following has to be shown: (c) expression (18) is at least as great as (strictly
greater than) I0,γ,φRDEU( f ) whenever φ is (strictly) convex, and (d) expression (18) is
strictly greater than I0,γ,φRDEU( f ) whenever µ( f ) 6= µ(g).
Consider
µ(α f g)+ 1
γ
ln(− [αW ( f )+(1−α)W (g)]) , (19)
and
αµ( f )+(1−α)µ(g)+ 1
γ
α ln(−W ( f ))+(1−α) ln(−W (g)) (20)
= αI0,γ,φRDEU( f )+(1−α) I0,γ,φRDEU(g) . (21)
It follows from Lemma 2 that whenever φ is (strictly) convex, expression (18)
is at least as great as (is strictly greater than) expression (19). Since, moreover,
expression (19) is at least as great as expression (20) by concavity of the ln function,
we have (c). In the case where µ( f ) 6= µ(g) and I0,γ,φRDEU( f ) = I0,γ,φRDEU(g), it holds that
W ( f ) 6= W (g) and, hence, expression (19) is strictly greater than expression (20)
by strict concavity of the ln function. If µ( f ) 6= µ(g) and I0,γ,φRDEU( f ) 6= I0,γ,φRDEU(g),
then expression (21) is strictly greater than I0,γ,φRDEU( f ). Hence, (d) follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an income growth process with as first and final stage income distribu-
tions respectively any g ∈F and f ∈F such that µ( f )> µ(g).
Consider the following two subpatterns, both of which describe how inequality
evolves as α increases over some subinterval (α,α)⊆ (0,1):
(a) A constant pattern over (α,α), i.e., for any α,α ′ ∈ (α,α), α f g∼ α ′ f g.
(b) A U pattern over (α,α), i.e., there exists an α∗ ∈ (α,α) such that, for any
α,α ′ ∈ (α,α∗], if α > α ′ then α f g≺ α ′ f g, and, for any α,α ′ ∈ [α∗,α), if
α > α ′ then α ′ f g≺ α f g.
We first show by contradiction that neither subpattern can be the case for any
(α,α). Suppose that (a) or (b) holds over some subinterval (α,α) ⊆ (0,1). Both
subpatterns imply that there exist some α,α ′,α ′′ ∈ (α,α) where α > α ′ > α ′′
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such that α ′ f g α f g and α ′ f g α ′′ f g. This is obvious in the case of (a). In the
case of (b), choose α ′ equal to the α∗ from the definition of (b). Note now that,
for α ′′′ = α ′−α ′′α−α ′′ , it holds that α
′′′ (α f g)(α ′′ f g) = α ′ f g. Consequently, it holds
that α ′′′ (α f g)(α ′′ f g)  α f g and α ′′′ (α f g)(α ′′ f g)  α ′′ f g. Since, moreover,
α ′′′ ∈ (0,1) and µ(α f g) 6= µ(α ′′ f g), we have a violation of (CSQC).
Now, any pattern for which subpattern (a) is not the case for some (α,α), is
either pattern (i), (ii), (iii), or a pattern for which pattern (b) is the case for some
(α,α). However, as we have seen, the latter is impossible. 
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